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Crane:

Did We Avoid Historical Failures of Antitrust
Enforcement During the 2008-09 Financial
Crisis?

Daniel A. Crane*

I have been asked to open this Symposium with an overview of
the history of U.S. antitrust enforcement during economic crises.
Having previously written an essay about the history of antitrust
enforcement during wars and economic downturns, 1 I will keep this
historical narrative brief. I will also add to the narrative some
observations that were not available to me a year and a half ago. I
wrote the original essay in the fall of 2008, with the din of Lehman’s
collapse still ringing in my ears, and therefore could only conjecture
as to the likely performance of antitrust institutions during the thenunwinding crisis. Now we have a few preliminary data points that
allow some modest observations about how things went his time
around.

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1
Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement Duing National Crises: An Unhappy
History, Global Competition Policy (Dec. 2008, Release One).

1
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I. HISTORY’S LESSONS
This symposium is about antitrust enforcement during economic
crises, but, in the historical narrative, it is too confining to separate
economic crises and wars. In both of those moments of severe
national anxiety, antitrust has taken a back seat to other political and
regulatory objectives. Antitrust enforcement has historically been a
political luxury good, consumed only during periods of relative peace
and prosperity.
In 1890, the Sherman Act’s adoption kicked off the era of
national antitrust enforcement. Barely three years later, the panic of
1893 provided the first major test to the national appetite for antitrust
enforcement. Speculative overexpansion in the railroad industry was
to blame for the crisis—a steep recession—and the Robber Barons
quickly rose to fix the problem. Financier J.P. Morgan and his chief
rival, the Kuhn, Loeb finance house, snapped up bankrupt railroads
out of receivership.2 By the turn of the century, the nation’s railroads
had been consolidated into six large systems, primarily controlled by
the houses of Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb. 3
Perhaps 1893 shouldn’t be included in the story, since antitrust
was still young and it wasn’t even clear that the Sherman Act applied
to mergers. However, by Teddy Roosevelt’s “trustbusting” days in
the first decade of the twentieth century, the reach of the Sherman
Act to exactly the kind of railroad mergers the 1893 crisis enabled
had become clear. 4 So the panic of 1907—the bursting of another
financial bubble—would provide a fair test case for antitrust’s mettle
in the face of political pressures to allow consolidation. There was
no central bank yet—except at the House of Morgan—and J.P. used
the crisis to extend his control over the banking system. Roosevelt
watched impotently as Morgan consolidated the banks, but was
forced to a point of decision when Morgan proposed to rescue the
Moore & Schley brokerage house by having U.S. Steel buy up a large
interest in Tennessee Coal and Iron. 5 Now Morgan would control
both banking and steel. Eager to avoid a “general industrial
smashup,” Roosevelt approved the deal within twenty minutes,
assuring Morgan that he would enjoy antitrust immunity for the
deal. 6

2

RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 67 (1990).
Id. at 68.
4
See Northern Secs. Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
5
Edmund Morris, Theodore Rex 499 (2001).
6
Id.
3
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The three-way 1912 election in which antitrust was one of the
defining issues, and the election of Woodrow Wilson, saw a period of
reinvigorated antitrust enforcement. 1914 brought the Clayton and
FTC Acts, steered in large part by Louis Brandeis, Wilson’s
regulatory braintrust and the author of The Curse of Bigness. But
U.S. entry in to World War I brought the Progressive experiment
with antitrust enforcement to a dramatic end. In 1918, Attorney
Geneal Thomas Gregory opined that antitrust law would be an
impediment to the war effort and most major antitrust cases were
suspended until the end of the war. 7
The Republican administrations of the Roaring Twenties
continued the “the era of [antitrust] neglect,” 8 but Franklin
Roosevelt’s election created hopes for a change in direction. Here is
the part of the historical narrative that has most entered recent
discussions. Instead of reinvigorating antitrust enforcement, during
the first half of the New Deal, from 1933-35, Roosevelt suspended
antitrust law through the National Industrial Recovery Act and put in
its place a system of industry-sponsored codes and controls on prices
and output levels. 9 The NIRA probably prolonged the Depression. 10
After the Supreme Court’s invalidated key portions of NIRA in
1935 and sentiment within the New Deal coalition turned against the
NIRA system, the Roosevelt Administration abruptly turned toward
renewed antitrust enforcement. 11 The antitrust divisions of Robert
7

See Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, Antitrust in Wartime, 16-SPC Antitrust
71, 71-72 (2002); Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 19211933: An Early Phase of a Continuing Issue, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 1067, 1068 (1989);
Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 969,
996 (1942).
8
Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 193 (1965).
9
See generally ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF
MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). Between 1933 and
1935, roughly the dates of the NIRA experiment, GDP increased about 28% and
unemployment dropped by about 2 million. Id. at 131. Although these figures
show improvement in the national economy compared to the preexisting state of
affairs, the experiment was roundly considered a failure, particularly in light of the
fact that “[o]ver ten and a half million workers were still unemployed,
approximately twenty million people were still dependent upon relief, basic
industries were still operating at little more than half their capacity, and the real
income of the average family was still thirteen percent below that of 1929.” Id. at
131-32,
10
Hawley, New Deal, supra note xxx, at 72-90.
11
See Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and
Antitrust in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORES 91 (Eleanor M. Fox &
Daniel A. Crane, eds. Foundation Press 2007).

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

3

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 3 [2010]

Jackson and Thurman Arnold greatly reinvigorated antitrust activity
between the late 1930s and 1940, but the revival was short-lived.
In 1940, while head of the Antitrust Division, Thurman Arnold
published The Bottlenecks of Business, 12 a book that defended
reinvigorated antitrust enforcement. He entitled Chapter IV A Free
Market in Times of National Emergency or War. Arnold wrote that
“[t]he antitrust laws must constantly defend the ideal of industrial
democracy against all sorts of pressures.” 13 With the prospect of war
on his horizon, Arnold observed that “these pressures increase when
the government is suddenly forced to buy huge quantities of defense
materials from closely controlled sources of supply.” 14 He further
noted that “[t]he temptation to exploit consumers and the government
through domination of a suddenly expanding market is almost
irresistible, and usually prevails unless it is curbed.” 15
Arnold turned out to be writing his own political obituary. He
soon began to face the “wholesale repeal or practical nullification of
antitrust in the face of the war planning and production leading up to
the U.S. entry into World War II.” 16 Consistent with the themes laid
out in Bottlenecks, Arnold continued to push aggressive antitrust
enforcement as an aid rather than obstacle to the war effort. But the
handwriting was on the wall. In 1942, when Arnold tried to indict
Averell Harriman, the chairman of the Union Pacific railroad, for
price-fixing he was quietly forced out of the Justice Department and
onto a seat on the federal court of appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Thereafter, the Roosevelt administration implemented formal policies
allowing immunization from antitrust prosecution, issued guidelines
for industry collaborations, permitted pooling of small firms, and
gave the secretaries of war and the navy the power to toll antitrust
cases until the termination of the war. 17 Over thirty cases were
tolled. 18
A clear pattern emerges in the historical narrative from the
promulgation of the Sherman Act until at least the end of World War
II. Antitrust enforcement consistently gave way to greater political
forces in the face of large-scale war or economic crises.
Carl Shapiro has characterized my historical narrative as
“gloomy” and taken consolation from the fact that “much of Crane’s
12

THURMAN ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940).
Id. at 60.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY 106 (2005).
17
Steuer & Barile, supra n. xxx at 72-73.
18
Id.
13
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discussion relates to reduced antitrust enforcement during times of
I’m not so sure that
war rather than economic distress.” 19
consolation is justified. Excluding the 1893 panic as an aberration
during antitrust’s primordial era, from 1890 until the end of World
War II we have antitrust recessions during an equal number of wars
and economic crises—the two World Wars and the 1907 panic and
Great Depression. More significantly, with the exception of Robert
Jackson and Thurman Arnold’s relatively short-lived and ultimately
unsuccessful efforts to revive and sustain antitrust enforcement at the
tail of the Depression and beginning of the war, we have no
counterexamples of antitrust institutions standing up to political
pressures for antitrust retrenchment.
Perhaps we can take consolation from the fact that the historical
narrative breaks off with the revival and then normalization of
antitrust enforcement following World War II. In my earlier essay, I
offered some very limited evidence of pressures for antitrust
retrenchment during the Korean and Vietnam wars, 20 but there is no
pattern of overall antitrust retrenchment during those conflicts or in
the more recent Persian Gulf, Afghan, or Iraqi wars. Then again,
those wars did not cause nearly the domestic economic dislocations
of the two world wars. In their peak years, World War I and World
War II consumed 13.6% and 35.8% of GDP respectively.21 No war
in the second half of the twentieth century or early twenty-first
century consumed more than 5% of GDP in its peak year and most
were closer to 2% or less. 22 Whatever their human, social, political,
and moral tolls, the post-World War II wars did not rise nearly to the
economic level of the great wars or economic crises and hence would
not likely have exerted political pressures on arcane areas of
regulation like antitrust.
Of course, there were also economic crises of various sorts in the
second half of the twentieth century, and no correlative pattern of
antitrust laxity. But, like the wars of the same period, the economic
dislocations were probably just too small to count. The 1981-82
recession, 1987 stock market crash, and 1997 Asian financial crisis
did not resemble the 1907 panic or the Great Depression, which were
(or felt like at the time) existential threats to the economic order. The
run-away inflation of the late 1970s certainly occasioned political
19

Carl Shapiro, Competition Policy in Distressed Industries, May 13, 2009,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm.
20
Crane, supra n. xxx at 8.
21
Congressional Research Service, Costs of Major U.S. Wars, July 24, 2008,
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm.
22
Id.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

5

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 3 [2010]

pressures on antitrust enforcement, but in the opposite direction from
depressions or panics. President Carter vowed to use more strenuous
antitrust enforcement to fight inflationary pressures. 23
The tight historical narrative of inevitable antitrust retrenchment
during depresionary crises and wars fades away during the second
half of the twentieth century, but arguably because the United States
did not experience any triggering events of sufficient magnitude.
Until recently, that is. Given the general consensus that the 2008-09
crisis was the deepest since the Depression, we may now ask whether
history recurred or was overcome by modern conditions.
II. AND HOW DID WE DO THIS TIME AROUND?
I will begin by cheating and saying that it’s just too early to tell.
There is a noble tradition of writing history as it unwinds, but I will
resist the impulse to join it. Richard Posner wrote A Failure of
Capitalism in late 2008, announcing that, whatever else others might
call it, we were in the middle of a depression. 24 He observed that
“[s]ome might think it premature to write about a depression before it
ends and indeed before it has reached bottom . . .[b]ut when it ends,
hindsight will rewrite history.” 25 Barely a year later, with the stock
market having rallied 20%, unemployment apparently leveled off
around 10%, and GDP growing 5.7 % in the fourth quarter of 2009, it
seems like the howls that might have prompted the “D” word a year
ago have abated without the appearance of the monster. At the risk
of rewriting history, I will wait until there is a sufficient time cushion
from the recent events to declare what actually happened.
One reason that it is premature to disagnose whether antitrust
retrenchment occured during the recent crisis is that antitrust
enforcement has changed in one important particular since 1945—
today, most antitrust enforcement is private. There are roughly ten
private cases for every government case. Hence, total antitrust
enforcement is less directly responsive to political pressures during
an economic crisis than it was in the days in which a private deal
between Teddy Roosevelt and J.P. Morgan meant effective antitrust
immunity for a several large industries or a tolling decision by the
Secretary of War meant that the cases would largely go away.
23

President Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint
Session of the Congress (Jan. 23, 1979), available at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=32657.
24
RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION x-xi (2009).
25
Id. at xvi.
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Private antitrust may be responsive to economic crises in several
conflicting ways. One empirical study suggests that private antitrust
enforcement may be counter-cyclical, with shocks to inflation,
output, and consumption having a positive effect (in varying degrees)
on antitrust enforcement. 26 The economic crisis could actually cause
an increase in private litigation. On the other hand, judges are
responsive to external political and economic conditions, as the
Supreme Court clearly was in its 1933 Appalachian Coals decision,
immunizing a coal cartel from antitrust liability during the
Depression. 27 Even if it takes more time for the judiciary to put the
brakes on antitrust enforcement, private plaintiffs may calculate that
the expected value of their lawsuits has gone down if they anticipate
increasing conservatism (in the sense of a greater reluctance to apply
antitrust law) by judges in response to desperate economic
circumstances.
For now, we can only speculate about the effects of the recent
crisis on private antitrust enforcement. As of this writing, the most
recent data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts are for
the period ending March of 2009, 28 and don’t tell much of a story.
There were 1,165 federal civil antitrust cases filed April 2006-March
2007, 1,063 filed April 2007-March 2008, and 1,062 filed April
2008-March 2009. Assuming that the roughly 9% reduction from the
earlier period to the two later periods has any significance, it
probably has as much to do with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Twombly 29 as with early recessionary pressures.
And what about public antitrust enforcement? Thus far, we have
seen little indication of the renewal of vigorous antitrust enforcement
that President Obama trumpeted on the campaign trail and Christine
Varney promised when she became Assistant Attorney General.
Apart from the Justice Department’s intervention in Google
Books 30 —a case that the DoJ did not originate—there have not been
major, headline-grabbing antitrust filings from the Justice Division.
Further, there are possible signs that more senior administration
officials are containing the Antitrust Division’s activities until the
economy improves. In July 2009, Ms. Varney publicly opposed
26

See Lance Bachmeier, et al, The Volume of Federal Litigation and the
Macroeconomy, 24 Int’l Rev. L & Econ. 191 (2004).
27
Appalachian Coals v. U.S., 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
28
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2009/contents.html.
29
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
30
Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., Statement of Interest of the United States of
America Regarding Proposed Class Settlement, September 18, 2009, available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/authorsguild.htm.
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Continental’s joining the Star Alliance, a measure that the
Department of Transportation approved. A New York Times story
reported that the dispute between the Antitrust Division and DOT
became so heated that White House Economic Council director Larry
Summers had to mediate, with DOT getting much of what it
wanted. 31
The article further reported that some senior
administration officials “fear that the crackdown is coming at a bad
time, as corporate America reels from recession,” 32 and hinted that
the White House may be muzzling the Antitrust Division’s efforts at
an antitrust revival.
It is still far too early to tell whether the Justice Department’s
eagerness to get back into the game of vigorous trustbusting has been
suppressed by higher political forces until the economy improves or
whether the Antitrust Division is just taking its time to develop a
suite of big cases. On the other hand, economic conditions have not
deterred the FTC from bringing a blockbuster case against Intel. 33
But, even there, the story is still unfolding. As an independent
agency, the FTC is perhaps less quickly responsive to external
political forces than the Antitrust Division, 34 but who knows how the
affair will end? Many of the markers of antitrust retrenchment
during previous crises were cases that were filed but then tolled,
abandoned, or rejected by the courts.
Let me conclude my non-committal review of the present by
circling back to the question of what counts as a sufficiently grave
economic downturn or war to trigger the previously observed
retrenchment impulses. It may turn out that the 08-09 crisis did not
last long enough to have a discernable effects on antitrust
enforcement. With hindsight, any apparent antitrust retrenchment
may seem like nothing other than the tail end of a political
administration that had little appetite for blockbuster antitrust cases
and the transition months of a more aggressive administration that
needed time to develop its big cases. A deep but short recession in
31

Stephen Labaton, Cracking Down, Antitrust Chief Hits Resistence, New York
Times July 26, 2009, Section A.
32
Id.
33
In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, Complaint Filed December 16, 2009.
34
The FTC is undoubtedly responsive to external political will, particularly of
Congress. See William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and
Congressional Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement: A Historical Perspective, in
PUBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 63(Robert J. Mackay, James C. Miller III, & Bruce Yandle, eds.
1987). But its response time may be slower than that of the Antitrust Division,
which is more immediately accountable to the elected branches of government
(particularly the executive).
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the middle of that narrative may turn out to be a footnote to the
broader antitrust story. Time will tell.
CONCLUSION
In her first major speech as the new Assistant Attorney General in
May of 2009, Christine Varney vowed that the new administration
would not forget the lessons of history. 35 She identified those
lessons as follows: “First, there is no adequate substitute for a
competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress.
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role in
the Government’s response to economic crises to ensure that markets
remain competitive.” 36
Are those really the lessons of history? “History” doesn’t speak
directly. It is up to us to draw out the “lessons,” if lessons are to be
drawn. Although everyone loves to quote Santayana’s observation
that “[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it,” 37 there is some danger in trying to extrapolate specific morals
from history. Historian David Hackett Fischer warns against a
“didactic fallacy” of attempting “to extract specific ‘lessons’ from
history, and to apply them literally as policies to present problems,
without regard for intervening changes.” 38 Given that the richest
evidence of antitrust abdication occurred during a fifity-some year
period that ended sixty-some years ago, Fisher’s admonition is
particularly pertinent.
Assuming that we are to draw lessons, it is far from clear what
they should be. On the one hand, a repeated pattern of antitrust
failures during major economic crises could lead to the normative
conclusion that antitrust institutions must steel their nerves and make
a more vigorous stand in the face of countervailing political
pressures. But one could draw a very different historical lesson.
Perhaps antitrust retreat during major crises is inevitable and standing
up in the brave tradition of Thurman Arnold, only to be sent packing,
is a noble but futile gesture. Perhaps antitrust officials should quietly
ride out the political-economic storms, doing incremental work at the

35

Christine A. Varney, Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era,
May 11, 2009, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/245711.htm
36
Id.
37
GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON: REASON IN COMMON SENSE 284
(1905).
38
DAVID HACKETT FISHER, HISTORIANS’ FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF
HISTORICAL THOUGHT 157 (1970).
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margins of the public eye, preserving capital so that they can move in
quickly to clean up the wreckage once the storm subsides.
I am not ready to commit to either of these morals as the true
lesson of history. In a few years, we will be able to look back at the
recent crisis and undertake a more objective evaluation with the
benefit of distance and data. In the meantime, we have a number of
very interesting theoretical papers to consider in this symposium.
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